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Abstract This paper studies intentional action in stit logic. The formal logic
study of intentional action appears to be new, since most logical studies of
intention concern intention as a static mental state. In the formalization we
distinguish three modes of acting: the objective level concerning the choices an
agent objectively exercises, the subjective level concerning the choices an agent
knows or believes to be exercising, and finally, the intentional level concerning
the choices an agent intentionally exercises. Several axioms constraining the
relations between these different modes of acting will be considered and
discussed. The side effect problem will be analyzed as an interaction be-
tween knowingly doing and intentionally doing. Non-successful action will be
analyzed as a weakening of the epistemic attitude towards action. Finally,
the notion of ‘attempt’ will be briefly considered as a further weakening in
this direction.
Keywords Agency · Indeterminism · Action theory · Modal logic ·
Formal epistemology
1 Introduction
This paper studies intention as a mode of acting. This is quite different from
studying intention as one of the elements of mental states of agents. Within the
computer science community working on logical approaches to AI, the best-
known paper on the latter subject is the one by Cohen and Levesque [16]. The
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difference in subject between the present work and that work is best explained
by Cohen and Levesque themselves [16, p 216]:
Most philosophical analysis has examined the relationship between an
agent’s doing something intentionally and that agent’s having a present-
directed intention. Recently, Bratman [7] has argued that intending to
do something (or having an intention) and doing something intentionally
are not the same phenomenon, and that the former is more concerned
with the coordination of an agent’s plans. We agree, and in this paper we
concentrate primarily on future-directed intentions. Hereafter, the term
“intention” will be used in that sense only.
In this paper we study the interpretation of intention explicitly excluded
by Cohen and Levesque: “intentionally doing”. The difference is parallelled
by differences in the formal apparatuses to study the notions. Cohen and
Levesque use a first-order logic where action types are represented in the
same way as in Dynamic Logic [24, 40]. More precisely: to talk about action
types they use a translation of propositional Dynamic Logic into their first-
order language. Although this approach enables them to reason about several
important properties of action, like pre and post condition reasoning in the
context of action (type) composition, it does not enable them to reason about
acting as such. In the formalism they put forward there is no object level
construct for expressing, for instance, that it is currently true that “agent agt
writes a paper”. As in Dynamic Logic, expressivity is limited to conditional
assertions like “if action a were to be executed, it would have as an effect that
a paper is written” and non-conditional assertions like “action a is executable”.
The reason that Cohen and Levesque do not need an operator for action
is that they do not study intentional action, but intention as a mental state.
For our study of intention as a mode of acting, we use stit logic. Stit logic
does enable us to talk about action unconditionally. For the present study,
another advantage of using stit logic rather than Dynamic Logic is that it is still
unclear how to express properties and aspects of agency in Dynamic Logic (ex-
amples are: refraining, deliberate choice, independence of agency, regularity,
etc.).
Having pointed out the difference with the work of Cohen and Levesque,
we want to stress that there are also issues that arise under both interpretations
of ‘intention’. In particular, one of the central issues in the work of Cohen
and Levesque is that intention is not closed under side effects of action (the
well-known denstist’s example). In our framework we will analyze the same
problem in the context of intentional action.
In philosophy, the understanding of the nature of intentional action is a cen-
tral theme, with contributions from Anscombe [3], Davidson [17], Chisholm
[15], Searle [42], Mele and Moser [37], and, more recently Knobe [31]. But our
main motivation for the present work comes from the literature on law and
deontic logic. As is well known, for a judge deciding on a verdict, there is a lot
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of difference between murder, manslaughter, homicide, killing in self-defense,
etc. Yet, all these acts concern one objective physical event: that of causing
someone’s death. The difference is in the mode of acting, that is, in the mental
state by which an agent’s act is accompanied at the time of conduct (the legal
literature speaks of ‘showing concurrence’).
In criminal law, the different modes of acting correspond with different
categories of culpability. And it is the judge’s task to assess to which category
a case belongs. Of course, different law systems have different categories. The
current North American system works with the following modes, in decreasing
order of culpability (as taken from [18]):
– Purposefully—the actor has the “conscious object” of engaging in conduct
and believes and hopes that the attendant circumstances exist.
– Knowingly—the actor is certain that his conduct will lead to the result.
– Recklessly—the actor is aware that the attendant circumstances exist, but
nevertheless engages in the conduct that a “law-abiding person” would
have refrained from.
– Negligently—the actor is unaware of the attendant circumstances and the
consequences of his conduct, but a “reasonable person” would have been
aware
– Strict liability—the actor engaged in conduct and his mental state is
irrelevant
In this paper we will be only concerned with the first two categories. We
formalize the distinctions between the other categories in [12] (which extends
and corrects [9]).
The first category, the one of acts committed purposefully, is about acts
that are instrumental in reaching an agent’s goal. So, this is the category of
intentional action. From a legal perspective it is important to asses whether
or not the intention in the action is malicious. The second category is not
directly about an agent’s intentions, aims or goals, but only about the condition
whether or not an agent knows what it is doing.
The plan of this paper is as follows. First, in Section 2 we introduce the
logic XSTIT from [12] as the base formalism in which we perform our analysis.
Section 3 introduces the combined operators we use to express the epistemic
and intentional attitudes towards action. In Section 4 we concentrate on the
notion of ‘knowingly doing’, mostly taken from [12]. Then, in Section 5 we
present our view on the notion of intentionally doing, and discuss the relation
and difference with knowingly doing. The well-known side-effect problem will
be cast in terms of the difference between intentionally doing and knowingly
doing. In Section 7 we observe that intentionally doing as defined in Section 5
does not leave room for intentional action being non-successful. We show how
to adapt the properties to allow for non-successful action. In particular, we will
weaken the notion of ‘knowingly doing’ to its belief equivalent. In Section 8 we
consider, as a suggestion for future work, how to weaken the epistemic attitude
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towards action performance even further, and discuss the concept of ‘attempt’.
Finally Section 9 discusses more future work and conclusions.
2 A Group stit Logic Affecting ‘Next’ States: XSTIT
As the basis for the investigation we use the the logic XSTIT first presented in
[10] and [9], and corrected in [12]. Since XSTIT is more extensively introduced
in [12], here we will give a briefer exposition of XSTIT and its extension with
epistemic attitudes.
XSTIT is a complete stit logic where actions take effect in ‘next’ states. For
those unfamiliar with the stit framework: the characters ‘stit’ are an acronym
for ‘seeing to it that’. Stit logics [5, 6] originate in philosophy, and can be
described as endogenous logics of agency, that is, logics of agentive choice
where action types are not made explicit in the object language. To be more
precise, expressions [A stit : ϕ] of stit logic stand for ‘agents A see to it that ϕ’,
where ϕ is a (possibly) temporal formula. However, where the founding fathers
of stit theory write ‘[A stit : ϕ]’, we prefer to write ‘[A stit]ϕ’, to be more in
line with standard modal logic notation. The main virtue of stit logics is that,
unlike most (if not all) other logical formalisms relating to action, they can
express that a choice is actually exercised by an agent. This relates directly to
the notion of truth in the semantics; truth is always evaluated against what we
call ‘dynamic states’ which consist of history-state pairs. This reflects that truth
of a formula says something about the dynamics of the agents in the system,
that is, about which choices they exercise and about what is true as the result
of that.
The fact that in our stit logic we adopt the ontological commitment that
actions only take effect in ‘next’ states, where ‘next’ refers to immediate
successors of the present state, distinguishes the logic from any stit logic in
the (philosophical) literature. A motivation for interpreting stit modalities in
terms of effects in next states comes from computer science, where this is the
more common view in formal models of computation (transition systems). This
choice has as a positive side effect that the logic is axiomatizable (and decid-
able). The logics of the multi-agent versions of the standard ‘instantaneous’
stit, are undecidable and not finitely axiomatizable [4, 26].
Besides the usual propositional connectives, the syntax of XSTIT comprises
three modal operators. The operator ϕ expresses ‘historical necessity’, and
plays the same role as the well-known path quantifiers in logics such as CTL
and CTL∗ [19]. Another way of talking about this operator is to say that it
expresses that ϕ is ‘settled’. However, settledness does not necessarily mean
that a property is always true in the future (as those not familiar with stit theory
often think). Settledness may, in general, apply to the condition that ϕ occurs
‘some’ time in the future, or to some other temporal property. This is reflected
by the fact that settledness is interpreted as a universal quantification over
the branching dimension of time, and not over the dimension of duration. The
operator [A xstit]ϕ stands for ‘agents A jointly see to it that ϕ in the next state’.
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The modality Xϕ is the next operator. It has a standard interpretation as the
transition to a next static state. Given a countable set of propositions P and a
finite set Ags of agent names, formally the language can be described as:
Definition 2.1 Given a countable set of propositions P and p ∈ P, and given a
finite set Ags of agent names, and A ⊆ Ags, the formal language LXSTIT is:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | [A xstit]ϕ | Xϕ
Our stit operator concerns, what game-theorists call, ‘one-shot’ actions. We
can also imagine to have a strategic stit operator (see [13]) where it is assumed
that groups of agents have multiple subsequent choice points to ensure a
certain condition (game-theorists call settings like these ‘extensive games’).
In the description of the structures, below, we will use terminology inspired
by similar terminology from Coalition Logic (CL) [39], and call the relations
interpreting the stit operator ‘effectivity’ relations. However, our effectivity
relations are not just the relational equivalent of the effectivity functions of
CL. Our effectivity relations are relative to histories and determine the possible
outcomes modulo the history. Effectivity functions in CL are relative to a state,
and yield sets of possible outcomes.
After the definition of the frames, we explain the elements they are built
from using the two visualizations of XSTIT-frames in Figs. 1 and 2.
Definition 2.2 An XSTIT-frame is a tuple 〈S, H, RX, R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}〉
such that:
– S is an infinite set of static states. Elements of S are denoted s, s′, etc.1
– H ⊆ 22S\∅ \ ∅ is a non-empty set of histories, which are ordered infinite
sub-sets of S. Elements of H are denoted h, h′, etc. Dynamic states are
tuples 〈s, h〉, with s ∈ S and h ∈ H and s ∈ h. Histories receive their order
from the next state relation RX over dynamic states: s′ is next of s on h if
and only if 〈s, h〉RX〈s′, h〉.2
– RX is a ‘next state’ relation that is serial and deterministic, and if
〈s, h〉RX〈s′, h′〉 then h = h′
– R is a ‘historical necessity’ relation over dynamic states such that
〈s, h〉R〈s′, h′〉 if and only if s = s′
– The RA are ‘effectivity’ relations over dynamic states 〈s, h〉 such that:
• R∅ = R ◦ RX
(empty-group effectivity is system unavoidability / settledness)
• RAgs = RX ◦ R
(Ags effectivity is next static state unavoidability / settledness)
1In the meta-language we use these symbols both as constant names and as variable names. The
same holds for the symbols h, h′, . . . used to refer to histories.
2To keep the conditions listed here as readable as possible we tacitly assume universal quan-
tification of unbounded meta-variables over static states, histories and groups.
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• RA ⊆ RB for B ⊂ A
(super-groups are at least as effective; in particular, effectivity for the
empty ‘group’ and possibility for the complete group are inherited by
all groups)
• For A ∩ B = ∅, if 〈s1, h1〉R〈s2, h2〉 and 〈s1, h1〉R〈s3, h3〉
then ∃s4, h4 such that 〈s1, h1〉R〈s4, h4〉,
and if 〈s4, h4〉RA〈s5, h5〉 then 〈s2, h2〉RA〈s5, h5〉,
and if 〈s4, h4〉RB〈s6, h6〉 then 〈s3, h3〉RB〈s6, h6〉
(independence of group agency)
In Fig. 1, we visualize a two agent XSTIT frame-part. For each state, the
choice structure for reaching next states as determined by effectivity relations
and history bundles is visualized as a two player game form. In stit logics,
acting, by a group A, is identified with ensuring that a condition holds on all
(dynamic) states that may result from exercising a choice (all the worlds the
choice is effective for). In terms of the visualization of Fig. 1, the choices of
Ag1 appear as columns of the game forms, the choices of Ag2 appear as rows,
the choice of the empty set of agents (which does not depend on the actual
history, and is thus moment determinate) appears as the outmost rectangle of
a game form, and the choices of Ags appear as the smallest squares inside the
game forms.
Before explaining the defined frame conditions in terms of this example
frame, we want to emphasize that in this visualization, historical necessity
relative to a dynamic state only ranges over all histories through the smallest
square determined by that dynamic state. I emphasize this, because in the



















Fig. 1 Visualization of a partial two agent XSTIT frame
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forms, historical necessity ranges over all histories within the outmost rectan-
gle. The difference is due to the fact that here a game form represents possible
next states, while in the traditional stit model visualizations, the rectangles
represent a partition of the current moment.
In terms of the visualization of Fig. 1 the condition R∅ = R ◦ RX says that
in each dynamic state (but also each static state) the empty group of agents
has exactly one option,3 pictured as the outmost rectangle of the game form
for the possible next states. More in particular, the inclusion R ◦ RX ⊆ R∅
says that the empty group of agents has only one option and has no power; it is
not effective to decide between any pair of histories whatsoever. The inclusion
R∅ ⊆ R ◦ RX says in addition that only the outcomes allowed by the empty
group of agents are possible as such.
The condition RAgs = RX ◦ R says that in each dynamic state the com-
plete group of agents has exactly one choice, pictured in Fig. 1 as the smallest
square of the game form for the possible next states containing the actual
history. The inclusion RX ◦ R ⊆ RAgs expresses that no agent or group can
exercise a choice that separates histories which in the next state run together
again. That is, even the choice power of all agents combined (Ags) cannot
separate the histories through the next state. So, what is achieved by Ags,
is settled for the next state. This corresponds to what in the stit literature is
called the principle of ‘no choice between undivided histories’. The inclusion
RAgs ⊆ RX ◦ R says that if something is settled for the next state, then that
is due to the current choices of the complete group of agents. Note that the
next dynamic state is not determined by the choices of Ags. But we might say
that the next static state is. This is the XSTIT equivalent of the semantic choice
in formalisms like ATL [1, 2] and CL [39] that defines that the complete set of
agents uniquely determines the next state.4
The condition RA ⊆ RB for B ⊂ A is known as coalition (anti) monotonic-
ity. In terms of the visualization of Fig. 1 it says that the smallest squares
(choices of the two agents combined) are contained in the larger rectangles
that determine the choices of the agents individually. The reason that we do
not have the condition RA ⊂ RB for B ⊂ A is that it is always possible to add
an agent to the system that has no power at all; an agent with the same powers
as the empty set of agents.5 Note that it cannot be the case that genuine choices
(that is, choices for which objective alternatives exist) of different agents are
identical (that is, correspond to exactly the same bundle of histories), because
this conflicts with independence of agency.
3We avoid the word ‘choice’ here, since some insist that it is intrinsic to the meaning of ‘choice’
that there is an alternative. One could argue however, that the same is true for the meaning of
‘option’ or even for the meaning of ‘possibility’. Later on we will distinguish between ‘choices’ and
‘genuine choices’ to make the distinction.
4In the semantics of CL and ATL there is no distinction between static states and dynamic states;
the states featuring in the semantics of these formalisms are best thought of as our ‘static’ states.
5However, one may argue that such agents are no agents at all. But, here we do not make the
distinction between agents and nature more precise.
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The independence of agency condition is a modal confluency property. In
terms of the visualization of the two agent frame in Fig. 1 it says that for any
history through a column choice of agent 1 and any history through a row
choice of agent 2, there is always a history through the unique smallest box that
is in the choice of both agents (in terms of the figure: it is in the intersection
of a row and a column). This expresses independence of agency, because it
says that the intersection of choices of different agents is never empty. If the
intersection would be allowed to be empty (smallest squares falling out of the
little game forms in the picture), choice exertion of one agent would possibly
make a choice of another agent impossible.
Contrary to what is suggested by Fig. 1 we do not have that different choices
of the same agent cannot overlap and that the combined choice of agents is
always exactly the intersection of the choices of the agents participating in
the collective choice. In modal logic we cannot characterize these conditions
as properties of the frames, since we cannot characterize that intersections
are empty. But since these conditions result in much tidier visualizations, we
assume them in the figures.
Definition 2.3 A frame F = 〈S, H, RX, R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}〉 is extended to
a model M = 〈S, H, RX, R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}, π〉 by adding a valuation π of
atomic propositions:
– π is a valuation function π : P −→ 2S×H assigning to each atomic proposi-
tion the set of dynamic states in which they are true.
The truth conditions for the semantics of the operators are standard. The
non-standard aspect is the two-dimensionality of the semantics, meaning that
we evaluate truth with respect to dynamic states built from a dimension of
histories and a dimension of static states.
Definition 2.4 TruthM, 〈s, h〉 |= ϕ, of a formula ϕ in a dynamic state 〈s, h〉 of
a modelM = 〈S, H, RX, R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}, π〉 is defined as:
M, 〈s, h〉 |= p ⇔ 〈s, h〉 ∈ π(p)
M, 〈s, h〉 |= ¬ϕ ⇔ notM, 〈s, h〉 |= ϕ
M, 〈s, h〉 |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔M, 〈s, h〉 |= ϕ andM, 〈s, h〉 |= ψ
M, 〈s, h〉 |= ϕ ⇔ 〈s, h〉R〈s′, h′〉 implies thatM, 〈s′, h′〉 |= ϕ
M, 〈s, h〉 |= [A xstit]ϕ ⇔ 〈s, h〉RA〈s′, h′〉 implies thatM, 〈s′, h′〉 |= ϕ
M, 〈s, h〉 |= Xϕ ⇔ 〈s, h〉RX〈s′, h′〉 implies thatM, 〈s′, h′〉 |= ϕ
Satisfiability, validity on a frame and general validity are defined as usual.
Definition 2.3 says that, like in standard stit semantics, dynamic states based
on the same static state can have different valuations of atomic propositions.
This might be considered counter-intuitive, since it would make sense to
assume that such propositions do not express truths about the dynamics of
the agent system, which implies that their valuation should be uniform over
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the histories based on the same static state (that is, their valuation should
be ‘moment determinate’ [28]). It is not problematic to adapt the semantics
with this extra condition. To preserve completeness for the axiomatization we
give below, we then would have to add the axiom p → p for p any ‘modal-
operator-free’ formula.
Definition 2.5 The following axiom schemas, in combination with a standard
axiomatization for propositional logic, and the standard rules (like necessita-
tion) for the normal modal operators, define a Hilbert system for XSTIT:
S5 for 
KD for each [A xstit]
¬X¬ϕ → Xϕ (Det)
Xϕ ↔ [∅ xstit]ϕ (∅-SettX)
[Ags xstit]ϕ ↔ Xϕ (Ags-XSett)
[A xstit]ϕ → [A ∪ B xstit]ϕ (C-Mon)
[A xstit]ϕ ∧ [B xstit]ψ → ([A xstit]ϕ ∧ [B xstit]ψ) for A ∩ B = ∅
(Indep-G)
Theorem 2.1 (From [12]) The Hilbert system of Def inition 2.5 is complete with
respect to the semantics of Def inition 2.4.
In the rest of the paper, we discuss logical properties not in terms of the
multi-agent frames of the type pictured in Fig. 1, but in terms of single agent
‘views’ on such frames. To explain this, in Fig. 2 we first give agent 1’s view
on the frame of Fig. 1. In this visualization, the choices for agent 1, as given
by the relation R{1}, appear as ellipses grouping different possible sets of next
states. We see the set of static states S pictured as little circles. The choices
of the other agent appear here as non-determinism of an unspecified source.
Strictly speaking elements from the set H of histories are not pictured. The
lines through the static states in the picture represent ‘history bundles’ (which
explains the names ‘Hb’ in the picture). In this figure (but also in Fig. 1)
branching of time is then represented as branching of bundles of histories.
Since this is only a partial frame, from the viewpoint of any static state there
may still be infinitely many choices ahead, which means that the number of
histories in a bundle through any pictured static state can also be infinite.
Figure 2 shows how agency is about exercising control over non-
determinism. All the choices of agent 1 in the picture represent different
possibilities for the agent’s potential to control non-determinism. For instance,
in static state s1 it has a choice between two deterministic alternatives. In static
state s2 it has nothing to choose from since there is only one non-deterministic
alternative; what state results depends on the choice of the other agent. In
s3 the agent has a choice between three alternatives that are in themselves
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Fig. 2 Visualization of the
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non-deterministic. Note that we talk about the choices as concerning ‘the
potential’ for controlling non-determinism. This is because the choices in
the picture only represent an agent’s objective possibilities to control non-
determinism. In Section 4 we will add an agent’s epistemic attitude towards
these objective choices. This means that we will be able to express to what
extent an agent knows about its abilities to control non-determinism. And in
Section 5 we will add the intentional attitude, enabling us to investigate logical
properties governing intentional control over non-determinism.
3 Operators for Knowledge and Intention
In his Philosophical Investigations §621 Wittgenstein famously asked: “What
is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I
raise my arm?”. The question is rhetorical, emphasizing Wittgenstein’s point
that the subtraction yields no residue.6 In conflict with this view, here we
start from the position that “my arm goes up” and “I raise my arm” are
essentially different: the first is the objective action while the second is the
simultaneous intentional action. We will explore the idea that any agentive
act can be considered at three different levels: (1) the objective level, i.e.,
the choice actually exercised, (2) the subjective level, which is about what an
agent knows or believes to be choosing, and (3) the intentional level, which
is about the intentional choice exercised. The objective level is accounted for
by the choices modeled in the base XSTIT logic of the previous section. To
account for the other levels of consideration, we extend XSTIT with epistemic
operators Kaϕ for knowledge of individual agents a, and operators Iaϕ for
6Thanks to Menno Lievers for pointing this out.
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‘agent a intends ϕ’. Subjective action is then modeled with the combined
modality7 Ka[a xstit]ϕ, and intentional action with Ia[a xstit]ϕ. We will not
discuss present (or immediate next state) directed intentions for ϕ of the
form Ia[a xstit]ϕ. Also we will not discuss future directed intentions for ϕ
of the form Ia F[a xstit]ϕ, where the F-operator is read as ‘some time in the
future’.8 This temporal operator is not in the object language of the systems
we consider here.
Definition 3.1 We extend the syntax of Definition 2.1 with an operator for
knowledge and intentional action, resulting in:
ϕ . . . := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | [A xstit]ϕ | Xϕ | Kaϕ | Iaϕ
Note that the stit-operators concern groups of agents, while the knowledge
and intention operators concern individual agents. In this paper we do not want
to consider the intricacies of the action versions of group knowledge and group
intention. We extend XSTIT’s semantic basis by the following definitions.
Definition 3.2 The class of general KI-extended XSTIT frames consists
of frames F = 〈S, H, RX, R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}, {∼a| a ∈ Ags}, {ia | a ∈ Ags}〉
such that:
– 〈S, H, RX, R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}〉 is an XSTIT-frame
– The ∼a are epistemic equivalence relations over dynamic states (corre-
sponding to the modal frame class S5).
– The ia are intention equivalence relations over dynamic states (corre-
sponding to the modal frame class S5).
In what follows, we will consider subclasses of the above general frame
class, where the relations R, RA, RX , ∼a and ia obey first-order Sahlqvist
conditions modeling the interactions between the associated modalities. We
choose this set-up, because we want to have the freedom to discuss different,
but sometimes equally defendable axioms for the interactions. Each set of
axioms gives a different logic and a different frame class as a subset of the
above general class. The whole point of this exercise is thus not so much to put
forward the logic of intentional action, but to show that the present framework
enables us to study the different possibilities and considerations for designing
such a logic.
7Note that we abuse syntax of the object language by denoting singleton sets of agents by the name
of the single agent in the set.
8The future directed intention for ‘seeing to it that ϕ some time in the future’, i.e., Ia F[a xstit]ϕ
should not be confused with the present directed (immediate) intention to ‘see to it that ϕ at some
time in the future’: Ia[a xstit]Fϕ. An example of the first is to intend to kill a certain agent some
time in the future, while an example of the second is to intend to now kill the agent at some time
in the future, for instance by placing a booby-trap in his car.
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When we consider KI-extended XSTIT frames without the intention rela-
tions, we will speak of K-extended (general)XSTIT frames. We can now extend
Definition 2.4 with clauses for truth conditions for the knowledge operator and
the intention operator.
Definition 3.3 The truth conditions for the knowledge operator Ka and the
intention operator Ia are defined as:
M, 〈s, h〉 |= Kaϕ ⇔ 〈s, h〉 ∼a 〈s′, h′〉 implies thatM, 〈s′, h′〉 |= ϕ
M, 〈s, h〉 |= Iaϕ ⇔ 〈s, h〉 ia 〈s′, h′〉 implies thatM, 〈s′, h′〉 |= ϕ
Herzig and Troquard were the first to consider the addition of knowledge
operators to a stit logic [27]. Later on the framework was adapted and extended
by Broersen, Herzig and Troquard [13, 14]. The epistemic fragment of the
present logic extends our earlier work on epistemic stit in several ways. In
particular, new properties for the interaction of knowledge and action are
proposed. Also the semantics, being two-dimensional, is different from the one
in [14]. Finally, the modeled concept is ‘knowingly doing’, whereas in e.g. [27]
the aim is to model ‘knowing how’.
Intention operators have been considered in the stit framework by Lorini
and Herzig [33, 34] and by Semmling and Wansing [43]. However, in both these
works, like in the work of Cohen and Levesque, the emphasis is on intention
as a mental state, and not on intention as a mode of acting.
4 Knowingly Doing
With the above definitions we can express that agent a knowingly sees to it
that ϕ as Ka[a xstit]ϕ [9]. Semantically: an agent knowingly does ϕ if ϕ holds
for all the dynamic states in the epistemic equivalence set containing the actual
dynamic state. In [14] we also called this ‘conformantly’ doing, in analogy with
the notion of conformant planning [22], which looks at plans that are successful
under incomplete knowledge about the current state.
We will go briefly through some notions that are expressible. As said above,
‘knowingly doing’ which is short for ‘knowingly seeing to it that ϕ’ is modeled
by Ka[a xstit]ϕ. Then, ‘having the ability to do something’, where we assume
that ability involves that the agent knows what it is doing when it ‘exercises’
the ability, is expressed as Ka[a xstit]ϕ. With a ‘strategic’9 notion of stit,
as in [13] or [11] the strategic notion of ‘knowing how’ can be expressed asKa[a sstit]ϕ. However, here we will not consider the strategic or ‘knowing
how’ setting. The notion of ‘knowing to have the capacity to cause a certain
9What is meant by ‘strategic’ here is that an action possibly involves several subsequent choices.
In game theory one refers to such settings as ‘extensive games’.
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effect, without knowing what to do to cause that effect’, is expressed as
Ka[a xstit]ϕ. An agent seeing to it that it knows something, or, learns, is
expressed by [a xstit]Kaϕ. Other variations speak for themselves.
Let us now consider the concept of knowingly doing in terms of the defined
frames and the models based on them. Figure 3 visualizes a possible way to
add agent 1’s epistemic indistinguishability relation to the frame of Fig. 2. We
need some background knowledge to interpret this visualization in the right
way. We know that the epistemic indistinguishability (or, equivalence) relation
∼a partitions the dynamic states of a frame. However, we will even assume
here that for every static state, ∼a partitions the dynamic states based on it
(which corresponds to the axiom K-S we discuss below). Now, equivalence
classes of dynamic states based on a given static state s are hard to visualize by
picturing them directly as separate bundles at point s in the figure. Therefore,
in Fig. 3, such equivalence classes are visualized indirectly as dotted rectangles
grouping all possible states next of s. Then, for any specific dynamic state,
by application of the combined operator Ka[a xstit]ϕ (that is, by following
elements of the concatenated relations ∼a ◦R{a}) we reach all the dynamic
states within a specific dotted rectangle. From the picture it is clear that these
dynamic states are always a subset of all possible next states.
In Fig. 3 we see that from static state s3, there are three objective choices for
the agent (s3-choice 1, s3-choice 2 and s3-choice 3), while there are two choices
the agent can knowingly exercise (the two dotted rectangles grouping choices
together). The dotted rectangles represent the two sets of states reachable
through ∼a ◦R{a} from different dynamic states based on static state s3. In this
particular frame, in s3 the agent cannot distinguish between s3-choice 2 and
s3-choice 3; as far as it knows, these choices are identical, which is visualized
by the dotted rectangle surrounding them.
We now briefly discuss possible properties for the interaction between
knowledge and action.
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Definition 4.1 The ‘knowledge of next states’ (KX) property, the ‘recollection
of effects’ (ER) property, the ‘uniformity of strategies’ (Unif-Str) property,
and the ‘static state knowledge’ (K-S) property are defined as the axioms:
Ka Xϕ → Ka[a xstit]ϕ (KX)
Ka[a xstit]ϕ → X Kaϕ (ER)
Ka[a xstit]ϕ → Ka[a xstit]ϕ (Unif-Str)
Kaϕ ↔ Kaϕ (K-S)
The axioms express intuitive properties for the interactions of knowledge
and action. Since they are discussed extensively in [12], here they will only be
briefly explained.
The ‘knowledge of next states’ (KX) property expresses that the only way
in which an agent can be certain about what holds next is by seeing to it
itself.10 In terms of the K-extended frame of Fig. 3 the axiom says that the
ellipses visualizing the objective choices are always contained inside the dotted
rectangles, that is, knowingly doing is closed under objective choices. Axiom
(ER) expresses that if agents knowingly see to something, then they know that
something is the case in the resulting state. Axiom (Unif-Str) expresses that if
an agent can knowingly see to something, it knows seeing to that something is
one of its causal capacities.11 For instance: the fact that I can knowingly break
the cup by throwing it on the floor implies that I know to have the causal power
to break the cup. For an example concerning the absence of the implication
in the opposite direction, consider the case of a blind person in a room with
a light switch (see [14]): the blind person knows it has the causal power to
ensure the room is sufficiently lighted, but it has no means to knowingly see
to it. Finally, (K-S) says that settledness and knowledge commute. This says
that agents can be uncertain about the choices of other agents and their own
objective choices, but never about the static state they are in. So, if we also want
to reason about uncertainty of the static states agents are in, this property is
too strong. However, for the purposes of the present paper that only considers
uncertainty as related to the mode of acting, we can safely assume it.
Proposition 4.1 The axioms given in Def inition 4.1 are all in the Sahlqvist
class. Therefore, they all correspond to f irst order conditions on the frames of
Def inition 3.2 and can be added to the Hilbert system of Def inition 2.5 to obtain
a complete system.
10This property can be refined, resulting in the two properties Ka[A xstit]ϕ → Ka[a xstit]ϕ for a ∈
A and Ka[A xstit]ϕ → Ka[A xstit]ϕ for a ∈ A. Since these refinements are not relevant here, we
do not discuss them.
11The stronger property Kaϕ → Kaϕ is also appropriate, but we will not discuss it here.
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Also for subjective action we can establish an independence property. If
objective choices of agents are independent (the Indep-G axiom of Section 2)
then also knowingly exercised choices are independent.
Proposition 4.2 Given the axioms of XSTIT and the axioms for knowingly
doing of Def inition 4.1 we can derive independence of subjective choice, which
is def ined as:
Ka[a xstit]ϕ ∧ Kb [b xstit]ψ → (Ka[a xstit]ϕ ∧ Kb [b xstit]ψ) (Indep-K)
Using correspondence theory we conclude the property follows. The inde-
pendence of agency property from XSTIT says that intersections of choices
of different agents are never empty. Now since a knowingly exercised (i.e.,
subjective) choice always contains at least an objective choice (axiom KX),
intersections of subjective choices of different agents are also never empty.
That knowledge has an entirely different character here than in most
other systems with epistemic operators, is maybe best explained through the
notion of ‘moment determinacy’ [28]. Semantically, moment determinacy of an
operator M is defined by the condition that the truth value of M is independent
of the history h in dynamic states 〈s, h〉. Syntactically, moment determinacy
can be defined as follows: M is moment determinate if Mϕ → Mϕ is valid.
An example of a moment determinate modality is ‘unconditional obligation’,
where what an agent is obliged does not depend on what it does, or on what
some other agent does.12
Now, in the present framework, knowledge is not moment determinate.
We cannot conclude to Kaϕ → Kaϕ, because that does not hold for the
substitution [[a xstit]ψ/ϕ]. And this seems right: an agent’s knowledge should
not only depend on the static context. If we can assume that an agent knows
what it does when it chooses something, what it knows depends on what choice
it exercises, and not only on the static state it is in.
5 Intentionally Doing
We will discuss the concept of intentionally doing in terms of the frame
of Fig. 4. The dotted ellipses represent intentional actions. We follow the
same visualization pattern as before: from state s1 the smaller closed ellipses
represent the objective choices interpreting the modality [a xstit]ϕ, the dotted
rectangles represent the choices the agent can knowingly exercise interpreting
the combined modality Ka[a xstit]ϕ, and, finally, the dotted ellipses represent
the choices the agent may exercise intentionally interpreting the combined
modality Ia[a xstit]ϕ. Now, assume the actual dynamic state is one based on
12Note however that, many interesting examples of obligation in deontic logic are of the kind that
does depend on what agents do (if you drive a car, you need to carry your license; if you kill, you
have to kill gently [21]). See [44] for a discussion on the moment determinateness of obligation.
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Fig. 4 Knowingly doing and





static state s1 and a history from the bundle Hb4. Then, the objective choice
exercised by the agent in s1 is the one visualized by the small ellipse around s3.
However, the intentional choice exercised is the one visualized by the dotted
ellipse around s4, s3 and s2. So, the agent intends to be doing what holds in
all the dynamic states based on the static states s4, s3 and s2 and the histories
running through them. At the same time the agent knows to be doing the action
visualized by the dotted rectangle around the states s3 and s2. So, it knows to
be doing what holds in all the dynamic states based on the static states s3 and
s2. So, what it intends to be doing is also what it knows to be doing. And what it
knows to be doing is also what it does (the small ellipse around s3). But not the
other way around. What it actually does is possibly more13 than what it knows
to be doing (on the dynamic states formed with s3, things may hold that are not
true on all the dynamic states formed with s3 and s2). And, what it knows to
be doing is possibly more14 than it intends to be doing (on the dynamic states
formed with s3 and s2, things may hold that are not true on all the dynamic
states formed with s4, s3 and s2).
Note that in the frame of Fig. 4 from static state s1 the agent has two
possibilities for exercising an intentional choice. This means that intentional
action in not moment determinate. Relative to the history under consideration,
one of the two intentional choices is exercised. Once more this emphasizes that
we do not model intention as a static mental state.15
13The exception is if s3 and s2 are bisimular. However, bisimularity concerns models, while here
we are concerned with logic properties at the level of frames.
14The exception is if s4, s3 and s2 are bisimular.
15If, in this example, we would have to associate the two possible intentional actions to a static
intention holding for the state s1, maybe we can think of this static intention here as a disjunction
of the two intentions in both intentional acts.
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Let us now investigate possible logics corresponding to the type of frames
exemplified by Fig. 4. In particular we are interested in logical properties
for the (combined) intentional action modality Ia[a xstit]ϕ and in logical
properties of interactions of other modalities with this combined modality.
Since we model present directed intention in action as an S5 modality, and
since the logic of the central XSTIT modality [a xstit]ϕ is KD, through corre-
spondence theory and composition of the relations interpreting the modalities
we get that the logic of the combined modality Ia[a xstit]ϕ is also KD. This
mirrors that intentional action is consistent, that is, it cannot be consistent
that an agent intentionally sees to it that ϕ and at the same time intentionally
sees to it that ¬ϕ. The corresponding D-axiom is ¬(Ia[a xstit]ϕ ∧ Ia[a xstit]¬ϕ).
In terms of the frame pictured in Fig. 4 this says that from any dynamic
state, we can reach all the states within the dotted ellipse representing the
current intentional choice by following (elements of) the composed relation
ia ◦ R{a}.
Now we turn to the interaction of intentional action with knowledge. First,
it seems correct to assume that intentional action has its result among the
states the agent knows to be possible next states. In XSTIT (Section 2) we
can easily derive an axiom expressing directly that objective action takes effect
in next states: Xϕ → [a xstit]ϕ. Here, for intentional action, we then need a
variant of this axiom, involving subjectively (i.e., epistemically) possible next
states.
Definition 5.1 The ‘intentional actions take effect in K-subjectively possible
next states’ (X-Eff-I) property is defined as the axiom:
Ka Xϕ → Ia[a xstit]ϕ (X-Eff-I)
In terms of the frame visualized in Fig. 4 the property (X-Eff-I) says that
dotted ellipses only contain states that are also contained in some dotted
rectangle. This enforces that if it is settled that the agent knows that ϕ in
the next state, which means the agent cannot do anything about it, the agent
cannot but intend that ϕ holds next. In a next section we come back to this
property when we discuss to what extent intentional action should imply that
an intentional or subjective alternative should be possible.
Now we go to the second interaction with knowingly doing. A crucial
property of intentional action seems to be that an agent only performs an
intended action if that same agent performs that action knowingly.16 If I send
an email, and by doing that I do not knowingly cause a server to break down,
16However, see the book of Mele [36] for a thorough discussion on the possibly conflicting position
that unconscious intentional choices are possible. Mele uses this position to argue against the claim
that it follows from experimental results in neuroscience (Benjamin Libet [32]) that agents have
no free will.
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I clearly do not intentionally bring down the server by sending the email.17
In the literature on intentional action this position was defended in [23], and
discussed in e.g. [20]. Within the present framework, we can capture this
property of intentionally doing by the following axiom.
Definition 5.2 The ‘intentionally doing implies knowingly doing’ (I ⇒ K)
property is defined as the axiom:
Ia[a xstit]ϕ → Ka[a xstit]ϕ (I ⇒ K)
In terms of the frame visualized in Fig. 4, together with property (X-Eff-I),
the property (I ⇒ K) says that any dotted rectangle visualizing what the agent
knows to be doing is contained entirely within the dotted ellipse visualizing
what the agent intentionally does.
All the constraints considered so far can be added to the system we had
so far to obtain a complete system. Henceforth, we will refer to the resulting
system as ‘the base system’ for intentional action.
Proposition 5.1 The axioms def ined in Def initions 5.2 and 5.1 are all in the
Sahlqvist class. Therefore, they all correspond to f irst order conditions on the
frames of Def inition 3.2 and can be added to the Hilbert system of Def inition
2.5 to obtain a complete system.
As for objective choices and for subjective choices, for intentional choices
we can formulate and prove an independence property. And this is how
it should be. If objective choices of agents are independent (the Indep-G
axiom of Section 2), and if knowingly exercised choices are independent, then
certainly intentional choices are independent.
Proposition 5.2 Given the axioms of XSTIT, the axioms for knowingly doing of
Def inition 4.1, KD for intentional action, and the interaction axioms (X-Eff-I)
and (I ⇒ K), we can derive independence of intentional choice, which is
def ined as:
Ia[a xstit]ϕ ∧ Ib [b xstit]ψ → (Ia[a xstit]ϕ ∧ Ib [b xstit]ψ) (Indep-I)
17One reviewer replies that maybe an agent might intentionally see to it that a flipped coin lands
heads up (the coin is manipulated and has two heads, and the agent also intends heads) without
knowingly seeing to it that the coin lands head up (the agent is not aware of the manipulation
and believes tails is a possible outcome). However, since the agent in this scenario believes that
failing to bring up heads is a possible outcome of its choice, we do not regard this as an example
of intentional action, but as an example of ‘attempt’, for which indeed, as we discuss in Section 8,
the epistemic attitude towards action is weakened. Independent of this, it is an interesting aspect
of this example that we can read a ‘Frankfurt style manipulation’ of the coin in it (even though in
Frankfurt style arguments the manipulation concerns a device interfering with an agent’s neural
activity). We plan to discuss such cases in a separate paper discussing and criticizing manipulation
arguments against compatibilism by representing the associated scenarios in epistemic extensions
of XSTIT.
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We do not give the formal derivation of the property in the modal ax-
iomatization. However, from correspondence theory, we can see that the
property must follow. The independence of agency property from XSTIT says
that intersections of choices of different agents are never empty. Now since
an intentional choice always contains at least a knowingly exercised choice
(the axioms KD for intentional action, (X-Eff-I) and (I ⇒ K)) which in turn
always contains at least an objective choice (axiom KX for knowingly doing),
it follows that intersections of intentional choices of different agents are also
never empty.
6 Deliberateness, Side Conditions and Side Effects
We call a choice ‘deliberate’ if it is the result of some form of deliberation on
the side of the agent exercising the choice. It is obvious that intentional action
falls in this category. In stit theory, deliberateness has been modeled through
so called ‘side conditions’ [29]. These side conditions are used to interdefine
deliberate and normal variants of stit operators. In our xstit-setting this inter-
definability takes the following form: [a dxstit]ϕ ≡def [a xstit]ϕ ∧ X¬ϕ and
[a xstit]ϕ ≡def [a dxstit]ϕ ∨ Xϕ. The idea behind the side condition X¬ϕ
in the definition of deliberate versions of stit operators is that a choice can only
be deliberate if there is an alternative choice that would not have guaranteed
the same outcome. Or, in other words, a choice cannot be deliberate if the
agent did not have an alternative, that is, if the outcome of the agent’s choice
was already settled. Now, of course, a similar intuition applies to intentional
action. However, in the previous section side conditions did not play a role at
all. Therefore, in this section we consider deliberateness and side conditions
as related to intentional action. And we show that the introduction of side
conditions in the definition of intentional action avoids the side effect problem
for intentional action. To our knowledge, this relation between side conditions
and side effects has not been suggested before.
6.1 Can we Infer Intentionality from Epistemic Conditions?
An agent deliberates with the information it has, that is, with the conditions
it knows and beliefs to be true about its environment and its capacities to
change its environment. This means that deliberateness of an intentional action
is about the interaction with the agent’s epistemic attitude towards action. First
we briefly discuss what we think is a wrong way to model this interaction.
Let us go back to what we already said about the interaction in the previous
section. We said that intentionally doing implies knowingly doing (axiom
(I ⇒ K)). But what about the other side of the coin? To what extent can we
conclude that an agent intentionally does something on the basis of what it
knows to be doing? Prima facie there is something to say for the position that
a logical inference in this direction makes sense. One might even go as far as
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to say that there is no distinction between knowingly doing and intentionally
doing: if an agent knowingly does something then it does it intentionally,
since given the circumstance that it knows what it is doing, if what it does
is not what it intends to do, it should have chosen to do something else.
However, this is too simple a view for several reasons. First of all, it is for
good reasons that the legal literature distinguishes between purposeful acts
and knowingly performed acts, and attaches different levels of culpability
to them, as discussed in the introduction. Second, if we argue for a logical
inference from knowingly doing to intentionally doing following the prima
facie viewpoint just mentioned, we should somehow account for the side
condition that “it could have chosen to do something else”. This means then
that we would have to consider to add one of the following principles as axioms
to the system:
Ka[a xstit]ϕ ∧ Ka[a xstit]¬ϕ → Ia[a xstit]ϕ
Ka[a xstit]ϕ ∧ Ka¬[a xstit]ϕ → Ia[a xstit]ϕ
Ka[a xstit]ϕ ∧ ¬Ka[a xstit]ϕ → Ia[a xstit]ϕ
The first property models the side condition as “the agent can knowingly
ensure ¬ϕ”, the second property models it as “the agent can knowingly refrain
from ϕ”, and the third models it as “the agent can perform an action different
from knowingly ensuring ϕ”. These are all different possibilities (ascending in
strength) for adding to the base system that from an agent’s epistemic attitude
towards its action and action possibilities we can derive the intentionality of
its action.
However, we should be sceptic about the appropriateness of these princi-
ples. First, in several respects, the operator Ia[a xstit]ϕ is already very strong. In
the next subsection we will argue that we should weaken it, by which we avoid
unwanted derivations concerning side effects. Second, it appears to me that by
adding principles like these we confuse the logic of an observer with the logic
of the agent acting. It is as if an abductive reasoning principle of an observer
agent (“it must be that that agent does this intentionally, otherwise it would
have done something else”) is turned into a deductive reasoning principle for
the acting agent itself.
Let us now come back to the direction of inference leading from an
intentional towards an epistemic attitude towards action. In particular, let us
consider the converse directions of the three properties above. In our opinion
this direction of inference is very intuitive. Part of it is, of course, already
incorporated by the axiom (I ⇒ K). But also, the circumstance of the agent
knowing that an alternative action is possible (the side condition) seems a
necessary condition for genuine intentional action: it reflects that intentional
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action presupposes a deliberation effort on the part of the agent in the sense
that it at least has considered to refrain from the intentional act. In the next
section we define a version of the operator for intentional action that satisfies
the converse direction of the third property above, thereby also avoiding the
well-known ‘side effect problem’.
6.2 Deliberate Intentional Action
Based on the notion of deliberative stit from standard stit theory [29], and
based on the observation in the previous section that in the interaction
between the intentional and epistemic attitude towards actions, the direction
of inference should be from the former to the latter, in this section we come
to a definition of deliberate intentional action. The side condition will be an
epistemic condition, reflecting that the deliberation leading to the intentional
act is based on what an agent knows about its capacity to bring about changes
in its environment. The definition then says that an agent’s act qualifies as
intentional if what the agent does is what it intends to do and if it also had
the possibility to knowingly refrain from what it does. Formally, we get the
following definition.
Definition 6.1 The modality ‘agent a deliberately intentionally sees to it that
next ϕ’, denoted [a xint]ϕ is defined as:
[a xint]ϕ ≡def Ia[a xstit]ϕ ∧ ¬Ka[a xstit]ϕ
6.3 Side Effects and Double Effects
In terms of static intentions and beliefs, the side effect problem is the problem
of whether or not intentions should be closed under knowledge (or belief). For
instance, if I intend to go to the dentist, and I know (or belief) going implies
having pain, it should not follow that I intend to have pain [16]. Or, from an
agent’s intention to bomb a terrorist’s home, and its believe that the house is
next to a school it should not follow that the agent intends to bomb the school.
Of course it is possible to argue that the agent does intend the pain and that
it does intend to bomb the school, since the agent maybe could have known
how to avoid these situations. But then we again make an inference in what
we regarded to be the wrong direction: from the epistemic attitude towards an
intentional attitude.
In the setting of this paper, concerning modes of acting, the side effect
problem gets a different flavor. Here the side effect problem concerns the
inappropriateness of, for instance, the inference from the premisses that an
agent intentionally visits the dentist, and all ways of knowingly visiting the
dentist are also ways to knowingly get pain, to the conclusion that the agent
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intentionally gets pain.18 Formally this means that we do not want the following
closure axiom to be derivable:
Ia[a xstit]ϕ ∧ (Ka[a xstit]ϕ → Ka[a xstit]ψ) → Ia[a xstit]ψ (SE)
However, using correspondence theory, it is not difficult to see that the
axiom (SE) is derivable in the base system of Section 5 (dotted boxes are
contained in dotted ellipses, so if ϕ is true in all points of a dotted ellipse, and
if for all dotted boxes inside the ellipse it holds that if ϕ holds for all points in
the dotted box, then ψ holds for all points in the box, then ψ holds at all points
inside the ellipse).
A first possible reaction to this problem can be that even though the
property (SE) has a counter intuitive aspect, it is too strong a requirement
for the logic to demand that such a weak property should not hold. The
property is rather weak, since it says that only if any possible way to know-
ingly do ϕ is also a way of doing ψ , we derive the intentionality of the
side effect. In many situations where side effects play a role, this require-
ment is not met. Let us take a closer look at the dentist’s example. As-
sume that Ka[a xstit](d ∧ p) = “knowingly visiting the dentist and have pain”
and Ka[a xstit]d = “knowingly visiting the dentist”. Clearly Ka[a xstit](d ∧
p) is a way of doing Ka[a xstit]d and we have as a logical fact that(Ka[a xstit](d ∧ p) → Ka[a xstit]d). Now assume the agent intentionally vis-
its the dentist but has no other way of doing that than by going to the dentist
and risking pain. Formalizing the situation of the agent, we come to the
set of formulas Th = {Ia[a xstit]d, Ka[a xstit](d ∧ p), ¬Ka[a xstit](d ∧ ¬p)},
that is, (1) the agent intentionally visits the dentist, (2) knowingly visits the
dentist in a way that causes him pain, and (3) does not know a way of visiting
the dentist ensuring that there is no pain. Clearly we derive that the agent
knowingly sees to it that it has pain (Th  Ka[a xstit]p). But, we cannot derive
that the agent intentionally sees to it that it has pain (Th  Ia[a xstit]p).
The axiom (SE) does not apply here. This is because in this situation all
ways of knowingly visiting the dentist are ways of knowingly risking pain.
For the axiom (SE) to apply it should have been the case that all ways of
knowingly visiting the dentist are ways of knowingly ensuring that there will
be pain. Of course, one can object that it is strange that in this modeling
example the agent actually knowingly ‘ensures’ it has pain while apparently
it could have made the choice for only ‘risking’ the pain. But then we are
again back in the situation of the previous section where we consider the
question whether it makes sense to derive intentional attitudes from epistemic
attitudes.
18See also Bratman’s example of the ‘marathon man’ where the side effect is wearing down his
sneakers [8], and Harman’s example of the sniper where the side effect is alarming the enemy with
the blast of the firing rifle [25].
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A second, more appropriate reaction to the derivability of (SE) in the base
system of Section 5 is to admit that we have to weaken the properties of its
intentional action operator Ia[a xstit]ϕ. Now, the kind of weakening we need
to avoid (SE) is the one provided by the definition of ‘deliberate intentional
action’ in Definition 6.1. We might say that just like the defined notion of
deliberate stit avoids logic properties like [a xstit], the defined notion of
‘deliberate intentional action’ avoids the property (SE) (property (SE) does
not hold with the Ia[a xstit] operators replaced by [a xint] operators).
We believe, the solution to the side effect problem provided by Definition
6.1 is intuitive. The core of the solution is that the side effect problem is
no problem if we look at an intentional act as the outcome of a process of
deliberation. For instance, imagine that an intention is the result of a process
of estimating maximal expected utility (MEU). In the weighing process the side
effects of actions of course have been accounted for. The positive utility of the
main effect outweighs the negative utility of the side effect. In such a situation
it makes sense to say that the agent intends the effect, and thus the action
associated with the main utility, but does not intend the effect associated with
the side effect. By considering side conditions, here we just introduce enough
of this weighing process into the logic to solve the problem and not derive
unwanted conclusions.
There is however one possible caveat. One might claim that even in case
the agent knows of no way to refrain from seeing to it that ϕ, it is possible
that the agent intentionally see to it that ϕ, for the reason that if it would have
had the possibility to refrain from its action it would have done so. Note that
in this argumentation for the intentionality of an action, the side condition is
entirely hypothetical, while in the operator for deliberate intentional action in
Definition 6.1 the side condition is a concretely existing possibility the agent
knows about.
If we accept this view on intentional action, Definition 6.1 no longer applies,
since it defines deliberateness relative to concrete alternative possibilities. It
seems then that if we want to take this suggestion seriously, we would have to
introduce a theory of model update in this setting, to model hypothetical or
counter factual situations (see [41] for the relation between counter factuals
and updates). However, in the present setting this step is not necessary. We
can distinguish between alternative actions and alternative choices. If we make
this distinction, then we can claim that alternative choices are always possible,
even though they can be unsuccessful and thus do not lead to an alterna-
tive action or outcome. The issue of success of choices will be discussed in
Sections 7 and 8.
As a final note for this section we observe that there is an interesting relation
between the side effect problem and the ethical doctrine of the double effect19
19Thanks to Thomas Müller for pointing to this connection.
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(going back to Thomas d’Aquino). Very roughly, the doctrine says that side
effects are excusable if the primary intention of an act was aimed at something
that is considered to be ‘good’ (think about trying to justify collateral damage
in warfare). This concept has a strong deontological aspect,20 and we leave its
discussion to another paper where we plan to consider the operators presented
here as building blocks of a deontic action logic.
7 Non-successful Choice
Axiom (I ⇒ K) ensures that an intended action is also a knowingly performed
action. Knowingly performed actions are successful actions in the sense that
the actual dynamic state is among the dynamic states in the epistemic equiv-
alence class (game theorists would say: ‘the information set’). Axiomatically,
we have that from (I ⇒ K) Ia[a xstit]ϕ → Ka[a xstit]ϕ and from the veridical-
ity of knowledge we derive that Ia[a xstit]ϕ → [a xstit]ϕ. Then with axioms
(Ags-XSett) and (C-Mon) we derive that Ia[a xstit]ϕ → Xϕ. Finally, with
standard normal modal reasoning, we arrive at Ia[a xstit]ϕ → Xϕ. This derived
theorem says that intentional action is successful: what an agent intentionally
does is also what happens.
But, for intentional action this is often simply not the case. What we in-
tentionally do, is not necessarily what happens. For instance, the environment
(including other agents) may behave unexpectedly, causing the actual action to
be completely different than the intended action. It can even be the case that
we intentionally perform an action and achieve the opposite. For instance, we
perform the intentional action of securing a precious vase that is too close to
the edge of a table, and by doing so, we cause it to fall to the ground.
The system built so far can be adapted to allow for the fact that intentional
action is not successful, in an elegant way. What we need to do is to allow
for a possible discrepancy between what an agent believes to be doing and
what objectively happens. So, what we need to do, is to weaken the notion
of knowingly doing to its belief analog. We do not have a good word for the
notion thus resulting; maybe ‘believing to do’ is the phrase that comes closest.
Let us explain the concept of believing to do and the way it allows inten-
tional action to be non-successful in terms of an example frame. In Fig. 5 we
see a situation where in s1 an agent has two objective choices which are non-
deterministic due to a second agent -not pictured- that has the possibility to
choose simultaneously. Assume that the actual dynamic state is one based on
s1 and one of the histories of the bundles Hb5 or Hb6. Now, also assume that
the agent’s intended choice is the one visualized by the dotted ellipse around
s3 and s4. Finally, assume that the agent implements this intended choice by
believing to exercise the choice visualized as the dotted rectangle around s3 (we
assume it does not implement its intended choice by believing to exercise the
20Going against a purely consequentionalist view.
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Fig. 5 Unsuccessful action in




choice represented by the dotted rectangle around s5 and s4, since it considers
it possible this results in s5, which is not according to the intention in its choice).
Now this agent is in for a surprise. The action it believes to do, is not the action
it really performs. The agent believes to end up in s3, but it ends up in s2 due
to unexpected choice interference of the other agent.21 So, its intended action
is unsuccessful.
The general semantic picture is thus that we want to allow for the situation
where the actual dynamic state is not among the dynamic states that are
epistemically accessible. Let us now very briefly present the resulting logic. We
change the knowledge operator in a belief operator, resulting in the following
syntax.
Definition 7.1 We extend the syntax of Definition 2.1 with an operator for
belief and intentional action, resulting in:
ϕ . . . := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | [A xstit]ϕ | Xϕ | Baϕ | Iaϕ
Definition 7.2 The class of general BI-extended XSTIT frames consists
of frames F = 〈S, H, RX, R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}, {b a | a ∈ Ags}, {ia | a ∈ Ags}〉
such that:
– 〈S, H, RX, R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}〉 is an XSTIT-frame
21We consider the situation where a choice is unsuccessful due to unexpected simultaneous choice
interference of other agents (or nature) to be the typical one. We take the viewpoint that agents
can never be mistaken about the choice they exercise themselves. They can however be mistaken
about which action they do, because they can be mistaken about simultaneous choice exertion of
other agents (or nature).
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– The b a are epistemic accessibility relations over dynamic states obeying
seriality and positive and negative introspection (corresponding to the
modal frame class KD45).
– The ia are intentional accessibility relations over dynamic states obeying
seriality, transitivity and euclidicity (corresponding to the modal frame
class KD45).
Definition 7.3 The clause for the truth condition of belief is:
M, 〈s, h〉 |= Baϕ ⇔ 〈s, h〉b a〈s′, h′〉 implies thatM, 〈s′, h′〉 |= ϕ
In the logic we now have KD45 instead of S5 for the individual epistemic
operators. For the interaction axioms corresponding to appropriate conditions
on the relations R, RA, RX , b a and ia (corresponding to particular subclasses
of the general frames of Definition 7.2), it is more difficult to find appropriate
candidates. We cannot simply turn all the axioms for knowingly doing in
Section 4 into belief equivalents. However, the axioms (Rec-eff), (Unif-Strat)
and (B-S) do have belief analogs.
Definition 7.4 The ‘B-recollection of effects’ (B-ER) property, the ‘B-
uniformity of strategies’ (B-Unif-Str) property, and the ‘static state belief’
(B-S) property are defined as the axioms:
Ba[a xstit]ϕ → X Baϕ (B-ER)
Ba[a xstit]ϕ → Ba[a xstit]ϕ (B-Unif-Str)
Baϕ → Baϕ (B-S)
For knowingly doing in terms of knowledge, in Definition 4.1 we had
the KX property. We explained in Section 4 that in terms of the frames of
Fig. 3 this says that the ellipses visualizing the objective choices are always
contained inside the dotted rectangles visualizing the subjective choices, that
is, knowingly doing is closed under objective choices. But that is exactly the
property we do not want here, to allow for a discrepancy between what an
agent believes to be doing and what it actually does. So here, what one believes
to be doing is not closed under the objective causal capabilities one has. In
Fig. 5 this is visualized by the ellipse around s2 not being contained in the
dotted rectangle around s3. So, in the example pictured by the frame (we
assumed the actual history, the one that we evaluate truth of formulas against,
is one in the bundle Hb6 and that relative this history the agent believes to be
exercising the choice represented by the dotted rectangle around s3), in s1 the
agent believes it has the power to ensure the conditions of the dynamic states
based on s3, but, in reality, it ends up in s2, satisfying the possibly different
conditions in this state.
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Finally, and most importantly, we also need new versions of the axioms
concerning the interaction of intention and the epistemic operator. We get:
Definition 7.5 The ‘intentional actions take effect in B-subjectively possible
next states’ (BX-Eff-I) property, and the ‘intentionally doing implies believing
to do’ (I ⇒ B) property are defined as the axioms:
Ba Xϕ → Ia[a xstit]ϕ (BX-Eff-I)
Ia[a xstit]ϕ → Ba[a xstit]ϕ (I ⇒ B)
Proposition 7.1 The axioms def ined in Def initions 7.4 and 7.5 are all in the
Sahlqvist class. Therefore, they all correspond to f irst order conditions on the
frames of Def inition 7.2 and can be added to the Hilbert system of Def inition
2.5 to obtain a complete system.
In terms of the frame visualized in Fig. 5 the property (BX-Eff-I) says
that dotted ellipses only contain states that are also contained in some dotted
rectangle. This captures that the agent must belief that the effects of intentional
actions are actually possible for the agent to achieve in the next state. And in
terms of the same frame, the property (I ⇒ B) says that any dotted rectangle
visualizing what the agent believes to be doing is contained entirely within
the dotted ellipse visualizing what the agent intentionally does. Together the
properties capture that agents can only perform intentional actions that they
can belief to be doing.
Mele [35] gives the example of a person absolutely believing to win a lottery,
apparently having completely misplaced confidence in her ability to predict
the outcome. The question posed is whether or not winning the lottery is an
intentional action in case the person wins, despite the odds. In our view, the
answer to the question whether or not this is an intentional action should not
depend on the outcome of the lottery. In the formalization given in the present
section, the winning of the lottery is an intentional action that is successful.
If this agent would not have won, which would have been far more likely, she
would still have performed an intentional action. However, to her surprise, and
her surprise only, the action was unsuccessful.
We conclude this section with the claim that in the logic with knowledge
replaced by belief, we indeed no longer derive that intentional action is nec-
essarily successful. We do not have that from (I-B) Ia[a xstit]ϕ → Ba[a xstit]ϕ
we derive that Ia[a xstit]ϕ → [a xstit]ϕ, because belief is not like knowledge
veridical.
8 Attempt and Future Research
In Section 5 we started with the axiom (I ⇒ K) saying that intentionally
doing implies knowingly doing. In Section 7 we weakened the property to
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(I ⇒ B) saying that intentional action implies that one believes to do an action
‘implementing’ the intention in the action. Here we want to briefly consider
what happens if we weaken the relation between the two attitudes towards
action even further. This means we come in the territory of the notion of
‘attempt’.22 One can argue that an important characteristic of attempt is that an
agent does not fully know or fully belief that the outcome will be as it intends.
In particular, besides its belief in the possibility of success, it believes in the
possibility of failure. If we accept this as part of the definition of attempt,23
we cannot model it by the intentional action operators defined in Sections 5
and 7. In particular, it follows that if we want to model attempt by an operator
[a xatt]ϕ, the following minimal requirements apply.
Definition 8.1 The ‘attempt implies knowing the possibility to fail’
(A ⇒ K-Pos-Fail) property and the ‘attempt implies knowing the possibility
to succeed’ (A ⇒ K-Pos-Succ) property are defined as the axioms:
[a xatt]ϕ → Ka¬[a xstit]ϕ (A ⇒ K-Pos-Fail)
[a xatt]ϕ → Ka¬[a xstit]¬ϕ (A ⇒ K-Pos-Succ)
However, at this point it is not clear yet if on the basis of these axioms we
can build a logic of attempt just as we did for intentional action in the previous
sections. Indeed the axioms of Definition 8.1 can be read as weakening the
epistemic attitude in the relation with intention as expressed by (I ⇒ K) and
(I ⇒ B). However, it seems clear that these minimal requirements are not
sufficient for a sensible notion of attempt. The point is that there is a wide
range of actions that fall under the definition of attempt if we stick to only
the above two properties to characterize the relation between the epistemic
attitude and the intentional attitude in action. One extreme is exemplified
by the nuclear explosion example of Mele and Moser [37]. Some agent can
prevent a nuclear explosion by typing a 10 digit code it does not know. It tries
anyway. The above requirements are met, because this agent knows there is
a possibility it succeeds and there is a possibility that it fails. So this would
count as an attempt. But then, under this definition, practically any intentional
action would qualify as an attempt, because the properties (A ⇒ K-Pos-Fail)
and (A ⇒ K-Pos-Succ) are very weak.
What seems to be missing from this view on attempt is that if an agent
can do things is several ways, an attempt is never a way of performing the
intended action that implements the agent’s intention less likely than some
22The notion of attempt studied here is different from the one studied by Lorini and Herzig
[33]. Lorini and Herzig consider attempts relative to action types α, and see them as the mental
counterparts of a potentially performed bodily movement α of the agent.
23Note that we have a subjective notion of attempt in mind. In an objective notion of attempt an
agent does not necessarily belief that an attempt can go wrong; the fact that it can go wrong can
be objectively true and at the same time not believed by the agent.
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other way to implement it. It seems simply absurd to qualify any action that
counts as a way to perform an intended action while satisfying the conditions
of Definition 8.1 as an attempt; only the ‘best’ ways to perform it, that is, the
ways most likely yielding the right result, should count as attempts. However,
this brings us in the territory of probabilistic reasoning. How to combine stit
logics with probabilistic reasoning is an entirely new subject of study that we
leave to future research.
9 Conclusion
We have presented an xstit logic analysis of intentional action. We have
discussed how by considering side conditions in its formalization we can avoid
that intentional action is closed under knowledge about side effects. Also we
have shown how to represent intentional action that is possibly not successful.
We argued that the distinction between successful and non-successful action
only makes sense if there can be a distinction between what agents belief to
do and what they actually do. If these coincide there is success. If these do not
coincide, there is failure. Finally we discussed the possibility of weakening the
relation between the epistemic attitude and intentional attitude in action even
further to account for a model of ‘attempt’.
On no grounds we can pretend to have shown that certain axioms are
definitely valid for reasoning about intentional action. And even less we can
pretend to have given all the axioms that make sense for reasoning about
intentional action. But what we do hope to have convinced the reader of is
that the semantic framework put forward here is suited to study the logical
properties of intentional action.
In the introduction it was explained that the main motivation for this work
comes from the legal literature. And in Section 4 it was mentioned that we plan
to consider the operators studied here as the building blocks of a deontic logic,
in the same way as in [12] the concept of knowingly doing is taken as the basis
for studying the legal concept of ‘mens rea’.
Several examples from the philosophical literature had to be left unex-
plained. For instance there is Davidson’s example of the wild pigs [17] and
Chisholm’s example of the murderous nephew [15]. Although most aspects
of these examples we can already model in the present framework, it seems
that these examples call for an intrinsically extensive game view on the
matter where action possibly involves an arbitrary number of basic actions
to be performed subsequently (for instance, Davidson’s example concerns the
intentionality of a complex action composed of an unsuccessful shooting action
followed by an unlikely environmental event compensating it). This means the
present theory should be generalized in the direction of [11]. See also [30] for
an ATL-based approach to defining intention in an extensive game setting.
Finally there is the formalization of the notion of ‘moral luck’ [38, 45]. One
way in which an agent can be said to be morally lucky is when the intention
of his action is bad, but circumstances cause that the action does not work out
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as badly as intended. It is clear we can represent aspects of this in the present
framework.
We are aware of the fact (not only because it was explicitly pointed out by a
reviewer) that the formal analysis of intentional action proposed in this paper
does not address many of the subtle and fundamental issues reported in the
very extensive philosophical literature on the subject. Indeed the whole point
of a formal analysis is to shed new light on these issues. However, it is not that
this paper tries to hide or ignore the many points raised in the philosophical
literature. The main reason that many of them are not addressed here is that
this paper does not pretend to be making anything more than a start with such
a formalization.
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